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Abstract 
Using data for the top 100 US mutual fund families for the period between Jan 2009 to 
Jun 2016, this paper studies the relationship between mutual fund families’ advertising on 
Facebook and their fund flow. In particular, I examine whether advertising via social media helps 
mutual funds to attract new fund flow. I also include the number of followers to proxy for 
visibility and past returns to control for performance. In line with previous research, I find that 
large part of the variation in the mutual fund flows remains unexplained. My findings suggest that 
the effect of higher attention drawn by social media advertising on the new fund flow (although 
positive) is weak.   
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1: Introduction 
With the emergence of different kinds of social media, the way people interact with real 
world has changed, and the way they buy and consume products and services has also been 
changed. The more popular social media becomes, the more companies focus on marketing on 
these platforms. The same trend applies to the mutual funds industry. Mutual funds, as one of the 
most popular investment products for investors, need to market themselves as they have the non-
negligible amount of retail investors. As a result, fund families1 have shifted the way they 
advertise and have become highly active on social media. It is also a way to compete with other 
types of investment products such as EFTs, which has gained a lot of attention recently and taken 
away some investment monies from the mutual funds. Thus, in this paper, I would like to look at 
the impact of advertising on Facebook and whether it helps to attract new fund flows to the fund 
family. 
In the past, fund family had advertised on traditional platforms such as newspapers and 
magazines. Recently, as social media became more and more influential, mutual fund families 
began to be active on the Internet as a way to advertise themselves. I looked at some fund 
families’ website and found out the most popular social media they use are Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube and LinkedIn. This paper chooses Facebook as the medium to start with as it appears to 
be the most relevant one among other platforms. 
The reason is that the way each platform achieves visibility is different, which provides 
ideas for my research. For example, LinkedIn is a relatively more professional platform and more 
targeted for people looking for a career in a certain industry. So even if a fund family has a lot of 
followers, this may not indicate more potential customers (which may not be true and can be a 
future research direction). Since the actual number of viewers for each post on YouTube is 
difficult to count as it is inflated (people who watched the first five seconds will also be included 
in the number of viewers) it is not ideal to use YouTube at this point. As for Twitter, it is limited 
by the length of each posting, which may pose certain restrictions on what the fund families 
would like to tell. Because of all the limits, it makes Facebook the most ideal social media to start 
                                                      
1 Fund Family: a group of mutual funds offered and managed by the same investment or management 
company. Generally, the constituent funds cover a wide range of fund categories and investment 
objectives. 
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with, as it targets to everyone on the Internet, is not career-oriented, and can post various types of 
files including photos, videos and articles. Perhaps there is some overlap too. So what you find 
for Facebook will hold for twitter and the other way around. So looking at just one platform is 
enough.  
On the other hand, mutual fund has always been the focus of researchers’ and fund 
managers, and the most important question has been what are the determinants of the flow of 
funds. As one of the potential reasons, advertisement has also been a popular topic. The reason is 
that advertisement influences people’s way of spending in certain ways. Thus, researchers are 
curious about whether advertisement helps the growth of fund flows to the fund family. In the 
past, a large number of studies have looked at fund flows and performance whereas other studied 
have looked at mutual funds advertising and fund flow. But there has not been much studies on 
the effects of advertising, fund performance and returns together on fund flows. Thus, I would 
like bring these factors together and look at the big picture. 
Having said that, the ultimate goal of this paper would still be to study the relationship 
between advertisements on Facebook and total monthly fund net flows to fund family, which 
focuses on whether social media attracts new fund flows. I select the top 100 largest US fund 
families, and I hand-collect information on their social media presence such as how long they 
have been on Facebook and how many followers they have, as well as financial information on 
their net asset values and performance. I estimate a panel data fixed effects model for the family 
flow of funds as well as a pooled regression model. The relationship is modelled as a four-factor 
regression model, similar to Fama-French model. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. The next section presents the 
literature review. Section 3 provides information on the data sources and discusses some 
summary statistics. Section 4 presents the methodology and interprets the estimation results. 
Conclusions and suggestions for future research are in the last section. The next section provides 
a literature review on the factors that have impact on fund flows. 
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2: Literature Review 
As mutual funds represent one of the most popular investment instruments, it has long 
been a focus on what contributes to the mutual fund flows. As of today, over 60 percent of 
investment products of US individual investors are mutual funds. Institutional investors also use 
mutual funds as important investment vehicle among other investment funds such as ETFs, 
endowments, foundations and pension plans. 
For instance, prior research documents a convex relation between past performance and 
the mutual fund flows. Ippolito (1992) find that investment monies in the mutual fund industry 
would move toward recent good performers and away from recent poor performers over the 
period 1965-84. The assumption is that low-quality funds exist so that investment performance 
residuals convey quality information. Wermers (2003) further shows that at least a portion of the 
persistence in mutual fund returns can be attributed to the tendency of consumers to aggressively 
chase mutual funds with high past returns, which results in fund managers chasing stocks with 
high past returns. Warther (1995) splits fund flows into expected and unexpected components and 
examines the relationship between unexpected flows and lag market returns. Luo (2003) 
examines the fund flows from the market volatility side and finds that stock funds react 
negatively to past market returns, while bond funds show trend-chasing pattern.  
Johnson’s (2007) paper suggest a flow components perspective by testing whether 
shareholders continue to respond to returns after they make their initial investment in fund shares. 
Results show that “new” and “old” shareholders have a similar, positive response to lagged 
returns when buying fund shares. Frazzini (2008) argues that individual investors are dumb 
money, meaning that they do the wrong thing by investing their money in mutual fund which own 
stocks that do poorly over the next few years. On the other hand, institutional investors are smart 
money and trade in the opposite direction of individual investors. Zheng (1999) argues that the 
smart money effect exists in small funds, although short-lived with the positive and negative 
portfolios reversals after 30 months. Also, even when the investors are able to pick good 
performers, execute timing can be a tricky factor. Friesen and Sapp (2007) find that investors who 
select the best performing funds also exhibit the worst performance timing of all. 
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When investigating the relationship between aggregate mutual fund flows and security 
returns, Warther (1995) find that flows into stock funds are correlated with stock returns, flows 
into bond funds are correlated with bond returns, and flows into precious metals funds are 
correlated with gold returns. Cross-correlations between the various groups is negligible. 
Meantime, mutual fund flows and security prices move together. 
From a more systematic perspective, there are studies on factors that may impact mutual 
fund flows. For example, Barber, Huang and Odean (2016) decomposed the returns of each 
mutual fund into eight components: a seven-factor alpha and flows associated with market, size, 
value, momentum factors, and three industry factors and find that flows respond to each of the 
eight return components, but to varying degrees, where the fund alpha generated the largest flow 
response. Also, the flows of investors who are likely more sophisticated—direct-sold investors, 
investors trading during low-sentiment periods, and wealthier investors are more aware that 
returns are not indicative of the skills of the fund manager. 
Investor behavior also has impact on mutual fund companies’ incentives with respect to 
risk. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) note that mutual fund advisor compensation is typically tied to 
funds under management which implies that investor flows serve as an implicit incentive 
mechanism. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) argue that compensation tied to relative return 
performance of funds under management that is assessed annually creates incentives for 
managers to effectively changing managerial objectives from a long-term to a short-term 
perspective. 
By studying the behavioral factor in mutual fund flows, Goetzmann, Massa and 
Rouwenhorst (2000) show that the difference between stocks and bond fund returns is the major 
behavioral factor. They also show that rebalancing decisions by investors are closely related to 
contemporaneous daily returns. They further attribute the result to the existence of behavioral 
factors per se such as market sentiment, or alternatively, flows and returns may both be correlated 
with an unidentified additional factor in the economy. 
Irrational investor behavior also contributes to the increasing fund inflows when funds 
change their names to different styles, where the funds experience a significantly negative fund 
flows over the 6 months before the name change and have not spent much on marketing and 
advertising (Cooper, Gulen and Rau (2005)). This effect also shows that most individual investors 
are irrational. Huang, Wei and Yan (2012) eliminates the impact from unsophisticated investors 
and demonstrates that higher volatility of past performance attenuates sophisticated investors’ 
reaction to past performance, making their fund flows less sensitive to performance. This 
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reduction in the flow-performance sensitivity may partially mitigate managers’ incentive to 
increase portfolio risk. 
Another interesting fact is the impact of the disposition effect on fund flows, a behavioral 
effect that has been widely documented for individual investors. Cici (2010) concludes that 
disposition-driven behavior has a negative effect on “winners” funds and could hurt investors by 
altering their asset allocations. 
Other than those aspects, an interesting point of view is whether the brand image brings 
fund inflows. When testing the effect of advertising on fund flows, Jain and Wu (2000) find that 
the inflows to the advertised funds are about 20 percent larger than those for the nonadvertised 
funds with similar characteristics. The advertised funds they chose were advertised in Barron's or 
Money Magazine and had a superior past performance. Moreover, Cronqvist (2006) finds that 
fund advertising can arouse certain key positive emotions in investors, which make their attitudes 
towards a fund more favorable. Following that, Wang and Tsai (2014) demonstrate positive and 
direct effects of brand image on purchase intention, where delivering a positive brand image is 
mostly done by advertising and marketing. Sirri and Tufano (1998) demonstrate the contribution 
of advertising on fund flows by showing the negative impact of investors’ search costs on fund 
flows, while advertisements reduce search costs to some extent because investors believe in the 
advertisements. . Sirri and Tufano (1998) also point out that garnering a larger share of current 
media cites is related to faster current growth. In a similar spirit, Barber and Odean (2008) 
conclude that individual investors display attention-driven buying behavior, while institutional 
investors do not display attention-driven buying. 
Above I reviewed the findings related to the mutual fund flows in order to give an overall 
idea on what factors might have impact on aggregate fund flows. While institutional investors are 
sophisticated, individual investors are the major players in the game of trend-chasing and 
irrational behaving led by advertisements. In the next sections I will describe the data I use for 
this paper. 
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3: Data and Summary Statistics 
For the empirical analysis, I use the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
mutual fund database to obtain information about fund’s total net asset value (TNA), fund 
identifier and the name of the fund family from the entire database. The data sample covers the 
period between January 2009 and June 2016. The reason the data starts from 2009 is because 
most fund families began to be active on Facebook in 2009. Non-surviving funds are included to 
account for survivorship bias. 
After obtaining the data, I group the mutual funds together by each fund family and then 
rank the size of the fund families according to their total net asset value in June 2016. Fund 
families that are ranked at the top 100 are selected as the sample for this paper. Next step is to 
collect data from CRSP. As stated above, monthly data for mutual funds belonging to the selected 
fund families during the period from 2009 to June 2016 are collected. To be more specific, after 
obtaining the data, I sum monthly TNA for funds that are from the same fund family to get 
monthly TNA of each fund family. Then I calculate the change of monthly TNA and monthly 
return for each fund family. 
Next, I look up on Facebook website to find out whether the fund families advertise. If 
that fund family does advertise, I search its profile to mark down when it starts to advertise, and 
how many followers it has so far. These will later be used to do the regression. Because there are 
about 90 observations on month and I only have current data on the followers, I assume the 
number of followers grows at a constant rate since the fund family began to be active on 
Facebook. 
Table I shows the summary statistics for the variables I mentioned above. Panel I is the 
summary statistics for all families. There is around 8,900 observations. The different between the 
number of the TNA and Ln(TNA) is due to some negative values in TNA, where TNA is the total 
net asset value. Ln(TNA) is the variable to represent size of the fund family in the regression 
model in the next section. The fund flow is calculated by (TNAt- TNAt-1*(1+returnt))/TNAt-1, 
where I take size and return into consideration and take those effect out, so the fund flow is 
presented as a percentage. And the monthly return of each fund family is the percentage change 
of TNA, denoted by Rt-1. Panel II and III show the summary statistics for fund families with 
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Facebook and without Facebook respectively. The average TNA for families with Facebook is 
much higher than families without Facebook. So do fund flows. Although, the average sizes of 
families with or without Facebook are about the same. 
 
Table I. Summary Statistics 
Panel I: Summary Statistics - All Fund Families 
  Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
TNA 8,978 135,995.50 319141.8 -13860 3631016 
Size, ln(TNA) 8,962 10.65 1.58 -2.3 15.11 
Fund Flows 8,977 123.92 10,994.06 0 1,040,400 
Returns 8,880 0.162 11.1922 -65.6674 1020 
Number of Followers 8,978 8930 57,297.92 0 1891530 
Number of FF with FB 100 61 
   Panel II: Summary Statistics - Fund Families with Facebook 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
TNA 3,248.00 238,686.00 478,029.30 4,114.50 3,631,016.00 
Size, Ln(TNA) 3,248.00 11.33 1.39 8.32 15.11 
Fund Flows 3,248.00 0.0143 0.2127 0 7.3501 
Returns 3,248.00 0.01 0.12 -0.82 2.71 
Number of Followers 3,248.00 168,635.50 320,748.10 89.00 1,891,530.00 
Panel III: Summary Statistics - Fund Families without Facebook 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
TNA 5,730 77,786.34 143,927.10 -13,860.00 1,350,970.00 
Size, Ln(TNA) 5,714 10.27 1.56 -2.30 14.12 
Fund Flows, ΔTNA 5,279 194.17 13762.02 0 1,040,400 
Returns 5,633 0.25 14.05 -65.67 1,020.00 
TNA is the Total Net Asset Value for all funds in one family; Size of each family is denoted by ln(TNA); Fund flows 
are the difference between TNA in two consecutive periods; Returns are calculated by the percentage change of TNA 
in two consecutive periods; Number of followers is the followers each family has in each period. 
 
Now, let’s look at how each component changed over the years. 
Table II shows the summary statistics for every single year. One thing to notice is that the 
average number of followers was only 3 in 2009 and rapidly grew to 65613 in 2016, with the 
number of fund families with Facebook grew from 8 in 2009 to 61 in 2016. The trend on both the 
fund families with Facebook and their followers show an increasing importance and popularity of 
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Facebook. As 2009 was near the end of financial crisis, the average TNA was at a relatively low 
level, with some fund families had negative TNA and negative fund flows. After 2009, TNA has 
been grow at a stable pace, with a bit reluctant in 2016. Returns on mutual funds are also worth 
noting: they were negative in 2010 and 2011, and they recovered in 2012 but have been 
fluctuating. It shows the overall unstable performance of mutual funds, although the TNA has 
been growing during this period of time. Overall, data from 2009 to 2016 all show an upward 
trend except returns are unpredictable. The rapid growth on Facebook and on the number of 
followers is remarkable. 
 
Table II: Summary statistics by Year 
Summary Statistics: 2009-2016 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
TNA 
93288.8 
(203651.7) 
108082 
(235115.3) 
119462.3 
(259160.3) 
127338.6 
(278681.8) 
146687.3 
(325141.9) 
165124.5 
(377722.8) 
173618.4 
(417806.9) 
171879.8 
(431791.9) 
Size 10.07 (2.01) 10.42 (1.61) 10.58 (1.5) 10.64 (1.5) 10.8 (1.47) 10.95 (1.4) 10.97 (1.4) 10.9 (1.43) 
Fund 
Flows 
941.0748 
(30309.05) 
0.5421  
(16.10) 
0.0536 
(10798.6) 
0.2676 
(8.9043) 
0.0047 
(0.0305) 
0.0036 
(0.0207) 
0.0093 
(0.1669) 
0.0166 
(0.2545) 
Returns 
1.2693 
(31.9949) 
-0.0011 
(0.7366) 
-0.0062 
(0.2314) 
0.0267 
(0.5168) 
0.0202 
(0.0655) 
0.0085 
(0.0592) 
0.000023 
(0.0693) 
0.0056 
(0.1289) 
Followers 3 (18.00) 22 (113.43) 161 (542) 596 (1776) 
2068 
(5796) 
6804 
(18483) 
24354.39 
(66577) 
65613 
(187522) 
Number 
of FF with 
FB 
8 20 37 48 51 53 57 61 
Number of FF with FB: the number of fund families with Facebook.                                                                    
Summary statistics of the mean of each variable with standard deviation in brackets. 
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4: Methodology and Results 
This section describes the model I use to examine the relationship between fund flows 
and advertisements, and interpret the results I find for the effects of different factors on fund 
flows. I also compare my results with related literatures in the aspects of the variables that impact 
fund flows. 
4.1 Methodology 
I use two regression models to explore the relationship between various factors and the 
fund flows for a sample of 100 fund families. The model uses monthly data covering the period 
between January 2009 and June 2016. First, I run a pooled regression model, and then I run a 
fixed-effect panel regression model to compare and contrast the results of the two regressions. 
The pooled regression model I use is: 
Fund Flowt = α1 + β1 FBt + β2 ln(Followers)t + β3 ln(TNA)t + β4 Rt-1 + ε, 
t = 200901, …, 201606, 
where the dependent variable, Fund Flowt, equals to [(TNAt- TNAt-1*(1+returnt))/TNAt-1], at time 
t, representing monthly fund flows to each fund family, FBt, represents each fund family’s 
advertisement status on Facebook and I use one to denote active and zero to denote not active at 
time t, ln(Followers)t represents the number of followers at time t, ln(TNA)t is the size of the fund 
families at time t, Rt-1 is the gross rate of return on fund family i at time t-1, calculated by [(TNAt 
– TNAt-1)/ ΔTNAt－1], β1, β2, β3 and β4 are the coefficients of each factor to Fund Flowt, and α1 is 
the constant factor that cannot be explained by the variables the model assumed. 
The fixed-effect panel regression model I use is: 
Fund Flowi,t = α2 + γ1 FBi,t + γ2 ln(Followers)i,t + γ3 ln(TNA)t,i + γ4 Ri,t-1 + ε, 
i = 1, 2, …, 100, t = 200901, …, 201606, 
where the dependent variable, Fund Flowt, equals to [(TNAt- TNAt-1*(1+returnt))/TNAt-1], on 
fund family i at time t, representing monthly fund flows to fund families, FBi,t, represents the fund 
family i’s advertisement status on Facebook at time t, , ln(Followers)t represents the number of 
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followers on fund family i at time t, ln(TNA)t is the size of the fund family i at time t, Ri,t-1 is the 
gross rate of return on fund family i at time t-1, calculated by [(TNAi,t – TNA i,t-1)/ΔTNAi,t－1], γ1, 
γ2, γ3 and γ4 are the coefficients of each factor to Fund Flowi,t, and α2 is the constant factor that 
cannot be explained by the variables the model assumed. 
The purpose of the two regressions is to get the coefficients and the alphas, which reveals 
how the fund flows are affected by each of the variables. A pooled regression has the advantage 
of using all the variation in the data, while a fixed-effect panel regression enables us to more 
complicated behavioural models and can also minimise the bias that might result if we aggregate 
individuals or firms into broad aggregates.2 A fixed effects model is a statistical model that 
represents the observed quantities in terms of explanatory variables that are treated as if the 
quantities were non-random. In panel data analysis, the term fixed effects estimator (also known 
as the within estimator) is used to refer to an estimator for the coefficients in the regression 
model. If we assume fixed effects, we impose time independent effects for each entity that are 
possibly correlated with the regressors3. The results of the two test are presented in below. 
Table III 
Pooled Regression: 200901-201606 on Top 100 Fund Families 
  Coefficient p-value 
Whether on FB 0 (omitted) 
 Number of Followers -0.0002 0.843 
Size 0.0057 0.020 
Returns, R -0.2833 0.000 
α -0.0600 0.030 
           Table IV 
Panel Regression: 200901-201606 on top 100 fund families 
  Coefficient p-value 
Whether on FB 0 (omitted) 
 Number of Followers -0.0180 0.000 
Size 0.2360 0.000 
Returns, R -0.2915 0.000 
α -2.5439 0.000 
 
                                                      
2 Panel Regression in Stata: An introduction to type of models and tests, Gunajit Kalita, Rio Tinto India, 
STATA Users Group Meeting, 1st August, 2013, Mumbai 
3 Source: Wikipedia 
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The hypothesis test is whether the coefficient equals to zero. The p-values indicate 
whether we reject the hypothesis that the factors are correlated to monthly fund flows. At the 95% 
Confidence Interval, p-values that are smaller than 0.05 will be rejected, meaning that the 
coefficient does not equal to zero and thus correlated to fund flows. Through the test I would like 
to find out whether β1 and β2 are significant, and whether α equals to zero, meaning that the 
models have correctly assumed all the factors that determine fund flows. Next part I will interpret 
and analyze the results. 
4.2 Results 
The two regressions give somewhat different results. The coefficient of FB is omitted due 
to collinearity. So we cannot tell whether advertising on Facebook helps fund flows in this model, 
which can be a future research direction done by a different model. From the pooled regression 
results we can see, the p-values of followers is higher than 0.05, meaning the results are 
insignificant at a 95% Confidence Interval. And the p-values of the number of followers, size, 
returns and α1 are smaller than 0.05, meaning the hypotheses are rejected and the results are 
significant at a 95% Confidence Interval. On the other hand, all the p-values from the panel 
regression results are smaller than 0.05, which means the results are rejected and are significant at 
the 95% Confidence Interval. 
As I could not get the result on Facebook in this model, I can focus on the result of the 
number of followers to have an estimation. Because the two factors are somehow connected 
inside. If the number of followers have a whatever impact on fund flows, it will certainly reveal 
some relationship between advertising on Facebook and fund flows. Looking at the results given 
by the two models, the difference mainly lies with the results on the number of followers, where 
it is insignificant in the pooled regression and significant in the panel regression. As I stated 
above, a pooled regression uses all the variation in the data, so it solves the problem as a whole 
without distinguish each fund family. In theory, if the data are ideal, fixed-effects regression is 
supposed to produce the same coefficient estimates and standard errors as ordinary regression 
when indicator (dummy) variables are included for each of the groups4, while in fact we get 
different results. The pooled regression is biased due to the inclusion of dummy variables. 
So, as the pooled regression gives a p-value of the number of followers higher than 0.05, 
it could be flawed due to the inefficiency of the model. For example, if we eyeball the number of 
followers’ data, we will observe that there is considerable variation (“action”) from one row to 
                                                      
4 http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/statistics/intercept-in-fixed-effects-model/ 
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the next. This variation comes in two “flavors”. One is inter-family (across fund family) 
variation: variation in the average number of followers from one family to the next. Another is 
intra-family (within family) variation: variation within each family over time. The pooled 
regression offered only inter-family (across) variation. And regressions relying on inter-family 
variation are problematic due to potential omitted variable bias. The solution is to focus on intra-
family (within) variation5, which comes to the point of using the panel regression. Because panel 
data structure makes it possible to deal with certain types of endogeneity without the use of 
exogenous instruments6. Since the effect of advertisements can be categorized as behavioural 
factor, it is reasonable to believe that the panel regression is more possible to provide a better 
estimation and results for our data sample. 
As this paper’s main goal is to find out whether advertisements help fund flows, let’s first 
look at that aspect from the number of followers. Combining the two models, the p-value of the 
number of followers indicate a weak correlation between the number of followers and fund flows. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient suggests a negative impact of an increasing number of followers, 
which means that the more popular a fund family’s Facebook page is, the less fund flow it has. It 
contradicts with the common sense held by most people that advertising helps the sales of 
products. The more active a fund family is on Facebook, the lower the fund flows. On the other 
hand, the negative impact of the number of followers reveals the impact of advertising on 
Facebook. Because the existing of followers drag down fund flows, advertising on Facebook 
place a downward pressure on fund flows as well.  
Next, let’s look at the result on the number of followers given by the pooled regression. 
The p-value means the effect of advertisement is insignificant, and the coefficient shows no 
correlation between advertisements and fund flows. The result conflicts with the panel regression. 
And the reason is as explained above: the pooled regression does not take into consideration of 
the variation within the fund families, and is more likely to give inaccurate results. As we are 
studying a behavioural model, a panel regression will provide a better solution.  
So, if the coefficient given by the panel regression holds, it means that advertisements on 
Facebook and accumulating more followers would actually make a negative contribution to the 
fund families’ net flows. Does it make sense? The answer is yes. There are several possible 
explanations.  
                                                      
5 http://www.jblumenstock.com/files/courses/econ174/FEModels.pdf 
6 http://faculty.washington.edu/ezivot/econ582/introductionpaneldata.pdf 
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First of all, advertising incurs costs, which may be too high to be overcome by the new 
fund flows. It could be that the inflows to funds are not enough to cover the costs (outflows) on 
advertisements. For example, to maintain a Facebook page, a fund family needs to have a 
marketing team, delivering positive public image, and even pay advertisement fees to Facebook. 
All these activities require extra expenses, which would otherwise be saved if choose not to 
advertise. And then the high costs result in negative fund net flows, while the fund inflows might 
already get improved. More importantly, we do not know whether higher spending is needed to 
attract more followers. This could contribute to the negative correlation.  
Bearing the cost effect in mind, other explanations will give more ideas. For example, it 
is possible that Facebook is not the right place to advertise mutual funds, as investors who 
purchase mutual funds may view Facebook advertisement in a different way than advertisements 
on a professional platform because Facebook is seen more as a social networking media. Thus the 
advertisements on Facebook pose a non-important image on the fund family’s brand name. This 
cannot reach a conclusion without further research, and it could be done by looking at the 
relationship between advertisements on professional platforms, such as Morningstar and 
Investopedia, and fund flows.  
Moreover, it could be due to investors’ rational behaviour. Sirri and Tufano (1998) point 
out a positive contribution of advertising on fund flows, because it reduces investors’ search cost 
and they believe in advertisements. The assumption is investors are irrational. However, as our 
result shows, it may not be the case. What if investors as whole are rational? It is possible that the 
advertisements on Facebook do reach to investors. It is just that they do not believe in the 
advertisements and would rather spend time searching for their needs. 
Besides, as the investors are constituted by individual and institutional investors, where 
individual investors show attention-driven buying behaviour and institutional investors do not 
(Barber and Odean (2008)), it could be that the buying behaviour of individual investors are 
offset by the rational institutional investors, who do not believe in advertisements but do their 
own researches. So even the amount of followers is increasing, there are more educated 
institutional investors. Thus, the fund families incur costs without having more inflows. Moreover, 
even it is not because of the different character between individual and institutional investors, it 
could be due to the different mindset of the two kinds of investors, as the way they interpret 
advertisements are different, resulting in negative fund flows. To find out whether my guesses 
hold, further studies can by done by splitting the fund net flows into fund inflows and outflows, 
  14 
and look into advertisement effects on fund inflows while taking costs on advertisements into 
consideration. 
One last possible explanation is that the amount of postings on Facebook are not high 
enough to make the quantity change. So even the fund families spend all the money, time and 
energy, their fund inflows are not high enough to cover costs. All the guesses provide ideas on 
future research direction. At this moment, we can conclude that advertising on Facebook is 
negatively correlated with fund flows to fund families using monthly data of the largest 100 fund 
families in the US. 
Back to the result on the number of followers. If it is true, what does it imply? Because 
the number of followers will not make a negative growth on fund flows, the fund families will 
have no incentive to attract new followers. The purpose of advertisements is to increase followers 
and thus incur more buying behaviour as the beginning. But if the model gives the right answer, 
then there is no reason for fund families to keep active on Facebook. The entire efforts the fund 
families put are not effective, since the followers they have would not help the sales record. Other 
than the conclusion we can get the test results, it worth thinking why the number of followers has 
this negative impact on fund flows. For example, is it possible that the followers that would buy 
the products are the ones have not seen the advertisements on Facebook? For an advertisement to 
display on a user’s Facebook page, the fund family needs to pay certain amount of fees to 
Facebook. So, it could be that, although the fund families input expenses, it is not enough to let 
most people see the advertisement. In this way, the fund families do not successfully attract their 
target investors. Again, this can be attributed to that the Facebook may not be an ideal platform 
for fund families to advertise, as it is more like a place for amusement and entertainment. Because 
when looking at a celebrity’s Facebook page, such as Justin Bieber and Taylor Swift, they are so 
popular and the followers they have would actually copy their apparels or styles. But we do not 
see this kind of influence on the advertisements of fund families. On the other hand, as the 
celebrities are already famous in the real world, the reason their followers are being enthusiastic 
is because they have known them before they follow them. This rule can be applied to fund 
families, where some families have a huge number of followers such as Fidelity, their followers 
are already buying their products. Then it will not make a difference on fund flows when they 
follow it on Facebook. Because of all that, it is also worth thinking what is the right form of 
advertisements for fund families.  
If the above explanations do not correspond to the reality, the model may be flawed in a 
way that it does not reveal the true relationship between advertisement and fund flows, which will 
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need further studies. Comparing to the literature I mentioned in Section 2, I cannot conclude 
whether result is inconsistent with Cronqvist (2006), where the paper shows that the advertised 
funds are more favourable by investors, since I cannot tell from the results whether it is because 
the costs are too high or because the fund inflows are too low. In this case, the effect of being 
active on Facebook arouse the same outcome in the fund families who advertise than those who 
don’t. As Wang and Tsai (2014) shows positive and direct effects of brand image on purchase 
intention, it is hard to tell whether it shows the same effect in our case.  
All I mentioned above are based on that the regression model is correct, and I did not 
discuss the possibility that it is flawed. Now, recall the Data section, I explained that I assume the 
number of followers grows at a constant rate because I do not have the data for the number of 
followers the fund families had in the past. Thus, this can be a false assumption and cause the 
model gives wrong results. If the followers do not increase at a presumed rate, or even has some 
fluctuations in the middle years, the results can be different. But to do this test at this moment, 
this is no better way. To improve the model, one could assume different growth rates for different 
time of period and run several simulation test, then analyze each result based on different 
scenarios. Another better way to solve this problem is to collect data on followers from now on, 
and run the test a few years later. I believe it will give a more accurate results. 
The result on the size of the fund family is not surprising. Both the pooled and panel 
regression give the same results with different coefficients. The p-value are smaller than 0.05 and 
the hypothesis is rejected so that the test result is significant. It indicates that the size of a fund 
family is correlated with its fund flows. Also, as the coefficient is positive, the correlation 
between size and fund flows is positive. It makes sense because big firms have more customers 
and business in reality. The same rule apply to mutual funds. The big firms have the most 
customers, which in turn bring up their revenue. Also, as big companies are more likely to realise 
economic scale, their costs would be lower than small firms. For mutual funds, as they are also 
products, investors have the incentive to choose a big fund family. Because a big fund family may 
let the investors believe it is more experienced, more secure, and more trustworthy, even though it 
may not be true. 
The result on gross returns is a bit surprising, as it states negative correlation between 
gross returns and fund flows. It conflicts with the findings in Ippolito (1992), which finds 
investment monies moving toward recent good performers. If the result holds, it implies that 
investors as a whole are rational, and they do not try to interpret future performance based on past 
returns. But it only means the investors as whole are rational and knowledgeable. To find out the 
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difference between individual investors and institutional investors, we need to separately study 
the reaction of the two types of investors. Because as Frazzini (2008) and Zheng (1999) show, 
individual investors are dumb money and institutional investors are smart money. Linking to our 
case, I cannot conclude if the overall rational behaviour of the investors is due to the higher 
portion of institutional investors than individual investors. 
One last estimation is the constant component α. It constitutes a negative part to fund 
flows and cannot attribute to other components in the model. It should raise our attention and 
further studies need to be done to find out the exact factors. As suggested by Warther (1995) and 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997), the factors may include security prices and mutual fund advisor 
compensation. These factors have been proved to be correlated to fund flows. In the case of the 
panel regression, all fund flows are explained by this unknown component, which gives 
researchers more incentive to further look at the factors inside it. 
As a whole, the model provides an estimation on the effects of advertisements and 
followers, and gives a rough idea on what affects fund flows. The results suggest a negative but 
weak effect of advertising on fund flows. To explore the more detailed relationship, many aspects 
can be improved in this paper, such as a larger sample size, a long time frame, and a more 
complicated model. Due to the limitation of the model and the data, this is the best result I can 
provide at this moment. 
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5: Conclusion 
The main goal of this paper is to find whether advertising on Facebook has an impact on 
monthly net flows to fund family. The sample fund families I use are the top 100 fund families in 
the US, ranked by the size of the fund family. The test period covers between January 2009 and 
June 2016. Reason for that is because most fund families start to be active on Facebook in 2009. 
Besides testing the relationship between advertisements and fund flows, I also include the number 
of followers, the size of the fund family, and the gross returns as independent variables in the 
regression model. 
To provide better estimation, I use a pooled regression model and a fixed-effect panel 
regression model respectively and look at the difference between the two regressions. Both 
regression models have their advantages. A pooled regression has the advantage of using all the 
variation in the data. A fixed-effect panel regression is more suitable for a complicated behavioral 
model and gets rid of the impact of dummy variables, thus providing a better estimation in this 
case. 
The results of the two regressions are similar except the results on the number of 
followers, which is the most important variable in this paper. The result of advertising on 
Facebook is not available because of collinearity, which may be tested by a different model in the 
future. The pooled regression shows no correlation between the number of followers and fund 
flows, while the panel regression shows a negative correlation. As a pooled regression is 
somewhat flawed for the data used in this paper, the result of the panel regression has the 
potential to provide the most appropriate result. The explanation for the relationship could be that 
the costs spent on advertising are too high, Facebook is not an ideal advertising platform for 
Facebook, or other reasons explained in previous section. The result does not mean that 
advertisements do not increase fund inflows and thus useless. This paper is limited in that I only 
look at the fund net flows. For future research direction, it might be a good idea to split the fund 
flows into inflows and outflows, and look at the relationship between the number of followers and 
fund inflows. One thing to notice is that I assume the number of followers grows at a constant 
rate since the fund families are active on Facebook. However, this assumption can be flawed and 
cause an inaccurate estimation. A further study can be done by assume various ways of growth 
and analyze the results based on those different scenarios. 
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The size of a fund family is positively correlated with fund flows, which seems 
reasonable as big firms have more customers and business. As long as big firms realised 
economic scale, costs can be low and profit can be high. The gross returns of the fund family 
show a negative correlation with fund flows. It implies that investors as a whole are rational and 
believe that past returns do not indicate future returns. This result conflicts with Ippolito (1992), 
which finds the investment monies move toward recent good performers. Since I do not separate 
the individual investors from the institutional investors, future studies can look at the effect of 
past returns on individual investors, which is proved to be correlated in other papers (Frazzini 
(2008), Zheng (1999)). Furthermore, there exists a negative constant (α) in the model, which 
causes a large portion of negative fund flows. This unexplained component should raise our 
attention and look for possible explanations. 
Overall, this paper finds that higher amount of followers on Facebook has a negative 
impact on monthly net flows to fund family and other factors also contribute to fund flows to 
different extent, while an explained constant component has the highest contribution to fund 
flows. Future studies can be focused on the number of followers and split the fund inflows from 
fund outflows. 
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